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Mass Surveillance and Data Protection in EU Law 
– The Data Retention Directive Saga 
THEODORE KONSTADINIDES* 
1 Introduction 
Mass surveillance in the European Union (EU) through the so-called Data 
Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) has been subject to intense controversy in the 
Member States. This chapter examines the contribution of the CJEU in 
unpacking the constitutional and human rights implications arising out of the 
retention of private data for the purpose of law enforcement. In spite of intense 
litigation, this chapter argues that the CJEU has not yet had the opportunity to 
rule on a number of essential constitutional and human rights questions related to 
the disproportionate invasion of the Directive on the right to privacy. The chapter 
commences with an account of how the Directive came into being as well as the 
main challenges met by the EU legislature in the process of adopting it. It then 
moves on to consider how the CJEU has defended the Directive in relevant cases 
regarding its interpretation or validity. The CJEU has so far dealt with the legal 
basis / competence aspect of the Directive. Although unconvincing, the CJEU’s 
rationale for far-reaching supranational action in the field of criminal justice has 
been endorsed by the Treaty of Lisbon.  
To use a colloquialism often employed by EU lawyers, the Communitarisation of 
what used to be the Third EU Pillar seems to have washed away any hanging 
questions with regard to the criminal justice spillover effect of internal market 
legislation. In light of this change, the main argument against Directive 
2006/24/EC remains that the smooth functioning of the internal market and 
maintenance of internal security cannot compromise the fundamental right to 
privacy and the rule of law – i.e. the values on which the EU is founded. 
However, the CJEU has not yet had the opportunity to rule on the encroaching 
impact of EU harmonisation legislation on digital civil liberties. The uniform 
retention of communication and location data throughout the EU has further 
raised questions on the dubious limits of EU regulation upon the conduct of 
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public enforcement authorities and private market actors through a mandatory 
data retention law. Hence, it is argued that the above questions exposed in recent 
litigation have not yet been properly addressed by the CJEU. It is further 
suggested that the CJEU’s jurisprudence does not imply that a set of strict criteria 
for justifying non-consensual, blanket and indiscriminate retention and therefore 
interference with a person’s right to privacy have been established. 
2 The adoption of Directive 2006/24/EC 
The Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC), which provides for a priori 
mandatory storage by a state and/or exchange between Member States of 
telecommunications traffic and location data (i.e. data generated in the ordinary 
course of service - excluding content),1 has been in force since 2007. The 
Directive requires telephone and Internet service providers to retain details of 
Internet and call data for not less than six months and not more than two years, in 
order to ensure that the data is available for the purpose of the investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime. The overall implementation of the 
Directive in the Member States has been well overdue. Although all Member 
States have either formally implemented the Directive or have made a start at 
doing so, effective transposition across the EU is far from reality. The 
Commission has initiated infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU 
against a number of Member States including those, such as Germany and 
Romania, that originally transposed the Directive into national law, but whose 
constitutional courts later ruled that such legislation was unconstitutional.2 The 
Commission has also handed down an Article 260 TFEU judgment against 
Sweden (examined later in this chapter)3 and is expected to do the same against 
Germany.4 Ineffective transposition of the Directive owes to the diversity of 
practice and difference of opinion between Member States on issues such as the 
duration and purpose of data retention, the procedures regulating access to 
personal data; and the cost of data retention for economic operators. The purpose 
of this section is to reveal the legal uncertainties that were somewhat disregarded 
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during the drafting process of the Directive. This analysis will serve to explain 
why the Directive has been the subject of intense litigation before the CJEU. 
The Data Retention Directive is the misshapen child of the aftermath of the 
London terrorist attacks in 2005, where it was commonly agreed between 
Member States that increased control over telecommunications is essential in 
order to investigate and prosecute terrorism and organised crime. Despite the 
strong political will of the governments of the Member States in favour of the 
establishment of EU surveillance tools, there was a significant gap in both 
national and EU legislation vis-à-vis data retention. Traffic data was either not 
stored systematically in the Member States or merely stored for billing purposes 
and in order to settle customer disputes. In some Member States, however, such 
data was not stored at all. As such, traffic data was not always available for 
public enforcement authorities to use against criminals for anti-terrorism 
purposes. Hence, following the Brussels EU Summit of 25 and 26 March 2004,5 
a group of four Member States6 presented a Draft Framework Decision to be 
adopted under the former Third Pillar as a criminal law measure. It is noteworthy 
that Sweden was one of the states that helped put forward the proposal and made 
an argument about extending the scope of data retention beyond judicial 
cooperation to all kinds of police cooperation. The Draft Framework Decision 
proposed a retention period between twelve to thirty-six months depending on 
the value of the data in relation to countering crime and the cost of retention.7 
Finally, the Commission decided that in tune with ex Article 47 TEU (now 
Article 40 TEU)8 the harmonisation of retention periods across the EU and 
exchange of traffic data by law enforcement authorities should be adopted under 
the former First Pillar. A Directive was thus considered as the most appropriate 
EU legislative instrument to regulate the obligation on providers of electronic 
communication services to retain their subscribers’ telephone and Internet data. 
Indeed, a Directive is less stringent compared to a Regulation and it allows 
considerable room for implementation manoeuvre to national governments vis-à-
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vis the appropriate public authorities to have access to the retained data.9 
According to Recital 5 of the Preamble to Directive 2006/24/EC, different 
requirements and technical differences between national provisions concerning 
data retention presented obstacles to the internal market and were to be 
harmonised. Moreover, the Commission set the time limit for the cross 
availability of data to a period between six months and two years from the date of 
communication. 
The inception and adoption of the Data Retention Directive constitutes a pre-
Lisbon example of cross-EU pillar interaction. In this case, a proposal for a 
Framework Decision by certain Member States inspired the Commission to put 
forward a proposal for a Directive. This is reminiscent of pre-Lisbon examples 
which demonstrate temporary synergy between the former EU pillars. For 
instance, with reference to the ship-source solution, while Directive 2005/35/EC 
ensured that polluters would be liable to criminal penalties in order to improve 
maritime safety, Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA contained the nature, types 
and levels of such penalties as a means of supplementing the Directive. The 
Framework Decision was, however, annulled by the CJEU which held that 
Articles 1 to 7 had as their main purpose the protection of the environment and, 
as such, they could have been properly adopted by using a former First Pillar 
legal basis (ex Article 175 EC – now Article 192 TFEU). Thus, similar to the 
Data Retention Directive, in the case of ship source pollution, a Directive was 
proposed on 13 March 2001 for the protection of the environment through 
criminal law. This is now Directive 2008/99/EC adopted on 19 November 
2008.10  
To return to our analysis on data retention, it needs to be stressed that had 
Directive 2006/24/EC been adopted now, the Commission would have most 
likely resorted to Article 83 TFEU as its legal basis. One should also note that the 
Treaty of Lisbon provides for a separate legal basis in the form of Article 16(2) 
TFEU, which is specific for the adoption of rules relating to the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by EU institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out 
activities which fall within the scope of EU law, and the rules relating to the free 
movement of such data.11 Back in 2005, however, the Commission had to justify 
the appropriateness of using a Directive (a First Pillar instrument) as a means of 
obliging Member States to establish a system for retaining communications data 
in order to tackle serious crime (a Third Pillar objective). In other words, the 
Commission had to find a ‘market’ angle. Hence, the argument was that diverse 
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regulatory and technical national provisions concerning the retention of traffic 
data subjected service providers to different requirements regarding the types of 
data to be retained and the conditions of retention. In light of this argument, a 
Directive on Data Retention was regarded necessary in order to bring down the 
internal market obstacles caused by such legal diversity in the Member States. It 
was, therefore, adopted under the legal basis of current Article 114 TFEU, the 
basis for harmonisation measures for the internal market. To avoid criticism, the 
Commission noted that data retention had constituted the subject matter of 
previous legislative instruments based on the former First Pillar, in particular 
Directives 2002/58/EC and 95/46/EC.12 
With reference to the protection of fundamental rights, the Commission 
recognised the Directive’s impact upon the privacy right of citizens as guaranteed 
under Articles 7 (private and family life) and 8 (protection of personal data) of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed and signed in 2000.13 
According to Article 6 (1) TEU, the Charter is legally binding and can be 
invoked as a guarantee of justice and constitutional recognition of the right to 
data protection. This is all the more important since the right to protection of 
personal data included in Article 8 of the Charter is unique and has no equivalent 
in the ECHR. Yet, the rights guaranteed by the Charter are not unconditional. 
Article 52 of the Charter provides justification for interference with the right to 
privacy and protection of personal data. According to Article 52 (1) of the 
Charter, ‘[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
Article 52 of the Charter, therefore, sets the (limited) scope of the right to respect 
private and family life and the right to the protection of personal data. 
Indeed, the cross-border nature of organised crime and terrorism and the fact 
that Directive 2006/24/EC only deals with the processing of traffic data by 
service providers and not their content was considered enough evidence by the 
EU legislature that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality had been 
complied with.14 The Commission stressed that limitations to privacy and the 
protection of personal data are proportionate and necessary to meet the objectives 
of countering serious crime and terrorism. As a result, no general provisions were 
proposed or adopted by the EU legislature vis-à-vis the safeguarding of the 
retention of communications data from potential abuses. This was the case 
especially since, according to the EU legislature, relevant data protection 
provisions were inherent in previous EU Directives.15 Despite criticism by the 
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European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) that a mere reference to the existing legal framework 
on data protection was insufficient to satisfy the intrusive character of the 
Directive,16 the EU legislature adopted a rather ‘flimsy’ and ‘flawed’ human 
rights test to ensure full compliance with citizens’ fundamental rights as 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.17 Directive 2006/24/EC was 
therefore adopted on 15 March 2006 and entered into force on 4 May 200618 with 
only two Member States voting against it in the Council - Ireland and the Slovak 
Republic.  
3 The CJEU’s response to challenges against the Directive 
As the above discussion illustrates, the Data Retention Directive appeared 
irreconcilable with both EU and national law. First, in the pre-Lisbon pillarised 
system, it was hard to see how the Directive’s centre of gravity concerned the 
functioning of the internal market and not public safety and crime prevention. 
Second, the Directive raised concerns with regard to the extent of the interference 
with individual privacy rights protected by EU law, the ECHR and national 
constitutions. This section will look into the two challenges that have taken place 
against the Directive: a direct challenge on the correctness of its legal basis and 
an indirect one on its compatibility with fundamental rights. The CJEU has, so 
far, only dealt with the procedural/ legal basis aspect of the Directive in Ireland 
v. Parliament and Council.19  In this case, Ireland brought an action under Article 
263 TFEU before the CJEU seeking the Directive’s annulment. With reference to 
the validity of Directive 2006/24/EC vis-à-vis its fundamental rights 
compatibility, in an action brought by the civil rights advocacy group Digital 
Rights Ireland (DRI) against the relevant Minister for Communications, the Irish 
High Court decided to request under Article 267 TFEU a preliminary ruling from 
the CJEU. Both challenges will be considered in turn hereafter. 
Looking back at the first challenge against the Directive in Ireland v. 
Parliament and Council one may conclude that it was a wasted opportunity. This 
is because Ireland that brought action against the EU legislature based its case 
solely on the grounds that the Directive had not been adopted on an appropriate 
                                                          
16
 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data processed in connection with the provision of 
public electronic communication services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 26.09.2005, COM (2005) 
438 final.  
17
 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data processed in connection with the 
provision of public electronic communication services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, COM (2005) 
438 final - 2005/0182 (COD). 
18
 Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision 
of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L 105/54. 
19
 Case C-301/06, Ireland v. European Parliament and European Council [2009] ECR I-593. 
 7 
legal basis - i.e. that it should have been adopted under a legal basis stemming 
from the ‘Third’ rather than the ‘First’ Pillar (i.e. not the internal market 
provision of Article 114 TFEU).20 Staying faithful to its tobacco saga judgments, 
in particular, its BAT dicta21 the CJEU held once again in favour of Article 114 
TFEU. The CJEU also resorted to the ‘preference clause’ of former Article 47 
TEU (current Article 40 TEU) as a means of determining the threshold for 
connecting a particular measure with the internal market.22 It was rather 
revealing at the time that the CJEU approved the indirect approximation of 
criminal law through internal market legislation. Yet, this aspect of the judgment 
has evaporated post-Lisbon given that the EC-EU dichotomy has ceased to exist 
and the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters has become a fully-
fledged EU policy. Indeed, under the current Title V of the TFEU, future 
measures in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters will 
take the form of Regulations and Directives adopted under the ordinary 
legislative procedure. 
The CJEU’s decision in Ireland v. Parliament and Council contains elements 
of both fundamental rights enhancement and human rights restraint. On the one 
hand, Ireland’s defeat before the CJEU meant that the Irish government could no 
longer afford to maintain a three-year retention period for telephone data under 
section 63(1) of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005, which was 
significantly longer to the one suggested by Article 6 of the Directive (six 
months and two years respectively). On the other hand, however, the 
Communications (Retention of Data) Act 2011 - which transposed Directive 
2006/24/EC into national legislation - requires Internet service providers to retain 
Internet data, previously not required by Irish law to be monitored or 
retained. This brings us to the second challenge against the Directive on 
fundamental rights grounds. The seeds to this challenge against the Directive 
before the CJEU were planted in 2009, almost at the same time that the Irish 
government sought to annul the Data Retention Directive on procedural grounds. 
It is also worth noting that there was a parallel legal universe behind these 
challenges as in November 2009 the CJEU delivered a judgment against Ireland 
following an Article 258 TFEU action taken by the Commission for failure to 
transpose the Directive within the prescribed period.23 
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As mentioned earlier, in the second (human rights) challenge against the 
Directive, Digital Rights Ireland (DRI) brought a case before the High Court of 
Ireland against the Minister for Communications.24 DRI challenged the 
Communications (Retention of Data) Act 2011, in particular the extent to which 
the State can require telecommunications providers to retain and to provide to the 
State, data on how customers use their services. In May 2010, the High Court 
held that DRI had sufficient standing to challenge the Communications 
(Retention of Data) Act 2011 and agreed to make a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU on the validity of Directive 2006/24/EC vis-à-vis its compatibility with the 
right to privacy.25 At the request of the Irish Human Rights Commission 
(IHRC),26 the High Court also sought guidance from the CJEU on whether 
national transposition legislation of an EU Directive must be in compliance with 
the human rights standards set out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
order to be compatible with EU law. In August 2012, the High Court made a 
reference for a preliminary ruling seeking interpretation of Articles 3,4, and 6 of 
Directive 2006/24/EC vis-à-vis their compatibility with Articles 7,8, 11 and 41 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights27  
Let us now make some speculations about how the CJEU may approach the 
DRI case. One would agree that the first High Court’s question regarding the 
compatibility of the Directive with the right to privacy was a matter of balancing 
necessity with proportionality. The CJEU may probably avoid engaging in a 
human rights discussion. Similar to Ireland v. Parliament and Council the CJEU 
may point out that Directive 2006/24 only goes as far as harmonising the 
obligations of providers of publicly available electronic communications to retain 
individual data for the purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of 
serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law. As such, the 
retained data shall be disclosed to the relevant public enforcement authorities in 
accordance with the national laws of each Member State. One could argue that 
this would not be the first time the CJEU adopted far-reaching legislation and 
subsequently left it to the Member States to determine the practicalities vis-à-vis 
the level of intrusiveness with regard to fundamental rights. The CJEU took a 
similar stance in Advocaten voor de Wereld on the definitions of the extraditable 
offences listed in the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW).28 It merely left the formulation of definitions of all-encompassing crimes 
such as terrorism and computer crime, to name but a few, to the competent 
authorities of the Member States. Of course the same could happen with 
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reference to Article 1 of the Data Retention Directive in relation to ‘serious 
crime’ which is not defined at EU level.29 
Advocaten voor de Wereld consists of the first national challenge against the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The case explored 
the practical consequences stemming from the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters vis-à-vis the conformity of the abolition 
of the principle of double criminality with the principle of legality. The CJEU 
stressed that because harmonisation of national criminal law is not a precondition 
for the application of the EAW, the absence of definitions for the thirty-two 
listed offences in Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision does not imply an 
inconsistency with the principles of equality and legality in criminal proceedings. 
The CJEU emphasised that whilst the EAW determines the scope of a procedural 
rule (the condition for surrendering criminals), it leaves it to the Member States 
to both define the extraditable offences listed in the EAW and provide for the 
appropriate penalties. As such, the CJEU held that the EAW is compatible with 
fundamental rights. The aftermath of Advocaten suggested a certain 
inconsistency deriving from the hesitation on the part of the EU institutions to 
address issues that are not raised in secondary legislation. It also unveiled the 
national courts’ disinclination to question the protection of fundamental rights in 
EU law beyond a selfish critique related to the constitutional safeguards against 
the application of EU legislation upon their own nationals. 
The case of data retention is different to extradition. The hesitation of the EU 
institutions to address the right to privacy owes to the fact that the Directive does 
not contain any rules governing the activities of public authorities for law 
enforcement purposes.30 Perhaps the CJEU had a point in Ireland v. Parliament 
and Council not to delve into a human rights discussion. Had the Directive 
contained a detailed system of data access and safeguards it would have been 
encroaching into the activities of the State in areas of criminal law and it would 
have had to be struck down as ultra vires. The Passenger Name Records (PNR) 
dicta is indicative of the thin red line that lies between EU legislation on data 
processing for a supply of services (intra vires) and data processing for 
safeguarding public security (ultra vires).31 In the PNR case, a Decision adopted 
under Article 114 TFEU enabling the transfer of air passenger name records from 
the EU to the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection was annulled. The 
CJEU held that the internal market measure of Article 114 TFEU could not 
justify EU competence to conclude an agreement with the United States on data 
processing for law enforcement purposes. Setting the PNR case aside, following 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, a new proposal for a Directive was 
put forward under Title V of the TFEU for establishing an EU-wide framework 
governing the collection, retention and use of PNR data - allowing Member 
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States to collect PNR data from intra-EU flights in order to counter terrorism and 
serious crime.32 What is more, in April 2012, the European Parliament approved 
a new EU-US PNR deal which allows US authorities to retain PNR data for up to 
five years.33 It is argued that these developments will generate further litigation 
with reference to the scope of privacy rights in EU law. 
As the present author has explored in a different paper, the Data Retention 
Directive was further fuelled during 2008-2010 by a number of constitutionality 
claims before the courts of the Member States.34 The transposition saga of 
Directive 2006/24/EC reveals that national courts have been reticent to question 
the protection of fundamental rights in EU law. They have merely resorted to an 
esoteric criticism of the constitutional safeguards against the right to privacy 
available in the national constitutions they defend and uphold. In light of these 
developments one may ask whether the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
likely to raise the threshold of human rights in EU law and help enhance the 
external scrutiny of EU legislation. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, post-2009 the 
Charter has become a formal source of EU law and comprises a standard of 
review for the validity of EU acts (Article 6 TEU). The case of Schecke forms an 
early example where the Charter was employed as a standard of review of the 
legality of EU secondary legislation on transparency laws in the management of 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) funding.35 The judgment is relevant to the 
question of the legality of the Data Retention Directive since the main provisions 
invoked in Schecke were those on the protection of private life and personal data 
under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, as well as Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The CJEU’s decision in Schecke suggests that despite the limitations to the 
right to privacy vis-à-vis Article 52 (1) of the Charter, the threshold for allowing 
data retention in EU law is high. The role of the principle of proportionality is 
ever crucial. The CJEU interpreted the ‘necessary’ requirement in the challenged 
Directive to mean ‘strictly necessary’ in the context of disclosure of personal 
data. In light of Schecke, the Data Retention Directive may have to be weighed 
against its alleged impact on privacy, and its overall design regarding its 
necessity and proportionality. The CJEU’s case law may further inform the 
second question addressed to the CJEU by the Irish High Court in the DRI case – 
i.e. whether national implementation legislation of an EU Directive must be in 
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compliance with the human rights standards set out in the Charter in order to be 
compatible with EU law. It is accepted that the Charter only binds EU 
institutions and Member States when they are implementing EU law. As such, 
the CJEU’s reply will most likely be positive: Whilst EU institutions can be 
reviewed for compliance with the Charter, national governments may only be 
reviewed when they act within the scope of EU law or when they transpose EU 
legislation into domestic law. It follows that the Charter applies not only when 
Member States directly implement a Directive, but also when they choose to 
derogate from it. The CJEU will soon be called to determine the external 
boundaries of the Charter’s application in light of two Austrian preliminary 
references made in 2013 to the CJEU on the compatibility of Directive 
2006/24/EC with Articles 7,8 and 11 of the Charter.36 
4 Letters from Sweden 
One would agree that the much-loathed Data Retention Directive constitutes a 
radical step in fighting crime in the EU. At the same time, it is hard to dispute 
that the Directive endorses state interference with the right to private life. Whilst 
waiting for the CJEU’s DRI preliminary ruling on the Directive’s legality, this 
final section will attempt to review current litigation before the CJEU and 
demonstrate the legal problems that Sweden has been called to resolve with 
reference to the transposition and interpretation of the scope of Directive 
2006/24/EC. The section begins by considering the relevant infringement 
proceedings against Sweden, the first Member State so far to have received a 
hefty fine for failing to implement the Directive within the prescribed period. It 
then moves on to discuss the recent case of Bonnier Audio AB, which arose from 
a preliminary reference made by the Swedish Supreme Court. The CJEU’s 
judgment is most controversial in terms of ‘floodgates opening’ given that the 
Luxembourg Court did not exclude the extended use of Directive 2006/24/EC by 
Member States for any offence committed using telecom networks, including 
copyright infringements. 
The EU adopted the Data Retention Directive in March 2006 and Member 
States were required to transpose it before 15 September 2007, with the option of 
postponing until 15 March 2009 the implementation of retention obligations 
relating to Internet data. Although most Member States have for some time 
operated a voluntary system of data retention of communications traffic data, 
they faced infringement proceedings by the Commission and were forced to 
                                                          
36
 See Case C-594/12, Seitlinger, Preliminary reference made by Austrian Federal Constitutional Court on 
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 12 
adopt new legislation in light of the threat of further action.37 In Sweden, the 
implementation of the Data Retention Directive has been delayed due to 
fundamental rights concerns. Sweden, which as mentioned earlier was initially in 
favour of Data Retention legislation, had a change of government in 2006, which 
resulted in minimal implementation of the Directive. The consequence of this 
was that in 2010, the Commission started infringement proceedings against 
Sweden under Article 258 TFEU and held that the government had failed to fulfil 
its obligations under the Directive.38 This action was followed by further 
Commission proceedings against Sweden in May 2011 under Article 260 TFEU. 
This time the Commission claimed that under Article 260 (2) TFEU, Sweden 
should pay financial penalties due to its failure to comply with the CJEU’s earlier 
judgment.39 In particular, the Commission proposed that the CJEU imposes on 
Sweden a daily penalty payment of EUR 40,947.20 and a fixed daily amount of 
EUR 9,597 for each day that the necessary measures were not taken to 
implement the Directive. Almost a year later, the CJEU is still expected to rule 
on the case against Sweden. However, on 31 May 2012, in light of Sweden’s full 
implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC, the Commission made a partial 
withdrawal of the case.40 This effectively means that although the Commission 
decided to withdraw the daily penalty payment, it has maintained the request to 
the Swedish government to pay the lump sum. The aim of the lump sum in this 
case is to penalise the continuation of Sweden’s infringement between the initial 
Article 258 TFEU judgment and the subsequent Article 260 TFEU judgment.  
On top of the Commission’s infringement proceedings related to the 
Directive’s delayed implementation, Sweden has been confronted with yet 
another value judgment related to the interpretation of the Directive’s scope with 
regard to who can have access to the retained data and the purpose for which 
such data can be used. The uncertainty related to the scope of Directive 
2006/24/EC stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Directive provides that the 
relevant data retained is destined for the competent national authorities in 
specific cases and in accordance with national law, without, however, listing any 
such authorities. This provision allows ample room for national discretion where 
Member States may choose to widen data access beyond law enforcement 
authorities and in any case they regard it appropriate. Such sloppy drafting of the 
Directive implies that apart from law enforcement authorities, both natural and 
legal persons may often obtain access to confidential data retained under 
Directive 2006/24/EC. This practice of ‘function creep’ was approved by the 
CJEU in a judgment delivered on 19 April 2012 from a preliminary reference 
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made by the Supreme Court of Sweden on the interpretation of Articles 3 to 5 
and 11 of Directive 2006/24/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.41 
In this case Bonnier Audio, a copyright holder of audio books, requested 
access to retained telecommunications data (name, address, and IP address) from 
an Internet service provider in order to identify a subscriber whose Internet 
Protocol address had been used for intellectual property infringing purposes. In 
the absence of a provision in Directive 2006/24 which prevents a party to a civil 
dispute from being ordered to disclose subscriber data to someone other than a 
public authority, the CJEU held that Member States are not precluded from using 
the Directive to enforce intellectual property rights. The CJEU held that the right 
to respect private and family life inherent in Article 7 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has to be balanced against the protection of intellectual 
property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. The CJEU further established for 
future cases that in the event a private party requests access to personal data, such 
access would have to be ordered by a national judge taking into account the 
principle of proportionality. The language of proportionality employed here by 
the CJEU is reminiscent of that in Rottmann.42 The proportionality assessment 
suggested by the CJEU in both cases lacks detail and guidance and, as such, 
leaves Member States considerable leeway to undermine the fundamental rights 
of their citizens in favour of large-scale data retention.  
5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to unveil the main complex issues surrounding 
the so-called Data Retention Directive as well as the CJEU’s contribution in 
assessing the internalities of the blanket harmonisation of the length of time that 
telecom operators and Internet providers must retain data under EU legislation. 
The chapter has provided insight into the blurry scope and objectives of the Data 
Retention Directive and, by extension, the future of telecommunications data 
retention in Europe which will have to be proportionality-friendly and subject to 
judicial oversight. It has been argued that the regime forged by Directive 2006/24 
lacks adequate legal safeguards in order to limit the risk of abuses of a host of 
rights guaranteed by both EU primary and secondary law as well as the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).43 This is all the more crucial since certain 
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studies on the application of the Directive in the Member States have 
demonstrated that blanket harmonisation of the length of time that telecom 
operators and Internet providers must retain data has proven to be superfluous for 
the investigation and prosecution of serious crime.44 The empirical evidence to 
support the necessity of data retention is overall poor. This is confirmed by the 
very revealing consultation paper published in late 2011 by the European 
Commission services on reforming the Directive.45 Among other things it is 
noted that the alleged value of historic communications data in terrorism or other 
cases involving serious crime has only been confirmed by eleven out of the 
twenty-seven Member States. It is also reported that the lack of clarification by 
EU institutions with regard to the type of data retained for combating crime or 
business purposes has resulted in confusion. For instance, some Member States 
have encouraged the storage of data (such as instant messaging and chat) which 
falls outside the scope of Directive 2006/24. As such, clarity with reference to the 
purpose and scope of the Directive as well as the establishment of safeguards for 
access and use of the retained data constitute high priority areas. 
In light of these developments, the present author welcomes alternative legal 
instruments to Directive 2006/24 - in particular, the proposal on data preservation 
put through by Peter Schaar, the German Federal Commissioner for Data 
Protection and Freedom of Information. The proposal, also mentioned by the 
Council’s Working Party on Data Protection and Information Exchange, suggests 
the substitution of the Directive on data retention with a ‘quick freeze’ system, 
which would make data storage dependent on a court order.46 Such a Kadi-
equivalent system would allegedly constitute a more efficient arrangement from 
the rule of law point of view, for the prosecution of serious cross-border crime 
than the current framework on blanket data retention. Such a system would 
discourage intense and all-encompassing telecommunications surveillance. It 
would also be fit for resolving civil disputes, which are unrelated to the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime. But still, in order to do so, the EU 
legislature has to come to a decision as to what constitutes ‘serious crime’ – a 
term which lies undefined in the Directive and, as seen in Bonnier Audio AB, 
gives complete discretion to Member States to hijack the Directive by using 
retained data for infringements which lie outside the scope of criminal 
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investigation. This study indicates that the lack of an exact determination of the 
area of data necessary for the identification of natural or legal persons (‘related 
data’) does not merely constitute a transposition problem that can simply be 
remedied through national legislation in one Member State. Data controllers 
established in several Member States will still have to make themselves familiar 
with diverse national legislation within the EU. The result is a fragmented legal 
environment that not only results in legal uncertainty but is also incredibly 
expensive for businesses.47 
Despite the overall dark picture painted in this chapter with regard to the 
alleged necessity of large-scale retention of traffic data, the new proposal for a 
Directive on the protection of individuals vis-à-vis the processing of personal 
data by law enforcement authorities for crime prevention is a positive 
development.48 If adopted, such a Directive will give meaning to Article 16 
TFEU both as a source of the right to protection of personal data and as a specific 
legal basis for the adoption of rules on the protection of personal data within the 
context of judicial co-operation in criminal matters and police co-operation. The 
character of the proposal is generally innovative in that it goes further than 
Directive 95/46/EC.49 For instance, it provides for the ‘right to be forgotten’ that 
allows individuals to demand that data collectors delete their retained data when 
there are no legitimate grounds to retain data. What is more, Article 54 provides 
for compensation by the Member States, controllers or processors for the damage 
suffered in cases of an unlawful data processing operation. The proposed 
Directive may not, however, be met with enthusiasm by all national governments 
which may be reticent towards witnessing the conduct of their public authorities 
being restrained by EU law. This is because the proposed Directive would extend 
the scope of data protection rules to ‘domestic’ processing. 
To reflect on the title of this edited volume, it seems that the once cooperative 
model of ‘European Police and Criminal Law’ has shifted towards a coercive 
one. Such a model is based on rapid and intrusive action against potentially 
serious security threats. The EU is, therefore, promoting a system whereby mere 
suspicion suffices to resort to actions, such as intense and all-encompassing 
telecommunications surveillance. Judging from the infringement proceedings 
against a host of Member States, it appears that not all national governments are 
ready to adapt to the coercive EU criminal law model (although Commission 
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infringement proceedings against them gradually force them to do so). As seen in 
this chapter, the effective transposition of the Directive goes further than merely 
establishing a legislative framework for the free flow of personal data in the 
internal market. The proposed Directive on data protection with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities may provide some relief to 
certain Member States with reference to the protection of individual privacy. It 
then depends on whether, in every day practice, national governments will 
choose the pervasive Orwellian surveillance state model over one based on a 
high threshold of individual data protection rights. 
